As one energy expert has noted, given the high cost and safety concerns, “Nuclear power will not feature soon in ASEAN’s energy mix for at least the next 20 years.”92 Finally, while there is growing demand among ASEAN countries for renewable energy sources other than nuclear power, Russia appears to have very little interest in pushing wind, hydroelectric, and solar power technologies that would undercut its exports of oil and natural gas. Simply put, Russia sees ASEAN as neither an opportunity nor a threat to its core interests, and cultivating closer relations with the bloc ranks very low on its list of foreign policy priorities. With China emerging as an industrial and manufacturing powerhouse, its economy displayed an ever-growing appetite for resources. After the turn of the seventeenth century, Russia waged a seemingly endless chain of wars with a succession of major European powers—Poland, Sweden, Turkey, France, the United Kingdom (UK), Austria, and Germany. For China, the United States and the Asia-Pacific constituted the primary area of economic and geopolitical interest, whereas for Russia, the main areas of concern were the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union that formed its immediate periphery, Europe, and the United States. But going back to Russia, the fact is that Russia is both in Europe and in Asia. They have increased substantially over the past fifteen years, largely as a result of three factors: a huge increase in ASEAN military expenditures, objections of ASEAN countries to human-rights conditions the United States attaches to its arms sales, and a desire to balance against China by developing improved ties with Russia. The fleet is configured for close-in defense missions to protect SSBN bases and the nearby waters in which they operate (for strategic deterrence), the maritime approaches to its major installations, the Arctic Sea, Russia’s exclusive economic zones, and nearby waters that contain a wealth of mineral resources. Why did Russia pass up on two different chances to take Constantinople. This does not mean that Washington should or can ignore Moscow, but it does mean that U.S. leaders, experts, analysts, and politicians should not obsess about Russia stealing a march on the United States and eroding its influence in the region. In both respects, Russia is content to serve as China’s de facto junior partner. 74 “News Conference Following the Russia-ASEAN Summit,” Kremlin, May 20, 2016, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51954. So the simplest answer would be: Russia belongs to both continents, Europe and Asia. If a watershed did occur, it was in relations with the West, which deteriorated sharply and consequently emerged as an even more important problem on the Kremlin’s agenda. The most important feature of this relationship, however, is its unrealized potential, which underscores Moscow’s heavy tilt toward China. In a highly symbolic gesture, he skipped the G8 meeting in the United States in May 2012, immediately after his inauguration, along with a bilateral meeting with then president Barack Obama.24 The start of his term was marked by large-scale protests against what many in Russia perceived as unfair elections and growing authoritarian governance. Back then, the Slavophiles believed that Russia should have relied on its unique heritage (traditions, Orthodox Christianity, rural life) while the Westernizers supported the idea of European-style modernization and individualism. A less cooperative relationship between them would be unlikely to prove consequential for Russia’s posture in these two regions. 47 Michael Kofman, “Vostok-2018: Russia and China Signal Growing Military Cooperation,” Russia Matters, September 10, 2018, https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/vostok-2018-russia-and-china-signal-growing-military-cooperation. The Soviet Union’s contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany, according to the Kremlin, entitles Russia to a special role in the affairs of Europe and the world. Thus, any attempt by the United States to drive a wedge between China and Russia over Southeast Asia is doomed to fail and would only further aggravate tensions in the U.S.-China relationship. Over the past decade, Russia has signed a number of contracts with ASEAN countries for the exploration and production of oil and natural gas and refined products (see table 4). Richard Sokolsky is a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program. 24 Helene Cooper and Ellen Barry, “Putin to Skip Group of 8 Session, Delaying Postelection Meeting with Obama,” New York Times, May 9, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/world/europe/ white-house-says-putin-will-skip-g-8-meeting-at-camp-david.html. Aleksandar Vladicic was a James C. Gaither Junior Fellow with the Russia and Eurasia Program. Russian arms sales are the exception to this rule. Culturally and politically, when people think of Russia, they typically think of Europe, or at least that’s what the consensus seems to be in the US. In other words, the focus of the Pacific Fleet is mainly on sea denial rather than sea control missions in open-ocean operations. 32 “Excerpts From the Transcript of the Valdai International Discussion Club Session,” Kremlin, October 3, 2019, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61719. It has had some success in expanding arms sales, trade, and energy cooperation with several members of ASEAN, but its relations with the organization itself are largely devoid of substance. 58 Hiroshi Kimura, Distant Neighbors: Japanese-Russian Relations Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin (Philadelphia: Routledge, 2015). Russia’s marginal role on the Korean Peninsula: Russia’s aspirations for a more significant role on the Korean Peninsula remain unfulfilled. If we consider the Ural Mountains as the border between Europe and Asia, 75% of Russians live in this area. In addition, the key sources of tension between the United States and China, on the one hand, and between the United States and Russia, on the other, are mostly disconnected. Short of a resumption of nuclear testing or unprovoked and highly provocative military actions by North Korea, Moscow and Beijing are unlikely to support new sanctions, even if Pyongyang resumes its testing of longer-range ballistic missiles. Since the creation of a Russian-ASEAN dialogue in 1996, the region has not loomed large in the Kremlin’s foreign policy, and Russia has been peripheral to ASEAN’s pursuit of its regional agenda, particularly the development of a security order based on multilateral cooperation among its member states and with outside powers.

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